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It is never an easy task determining whether an
“alien’s”1 misdemeanor crime of simple assault
or battery under RI Gen. Laws § 11-3-5 is an
aggravated felony, a crime of moral turpitude 
or a domestic crime of violence according to
the Immigration Nationality Act. This article
focuses solely on misdemeanor dispositions,2
under RI Gen. Laws § 11-5-3/12-29-5, and how
these dispositions are viewed in the immigration
context, as well as the consequences a client may
face based on a conviction or plea pursuant 
to this statute. Issues reviewed include: 1) the
consequences of a conviction or of accepting a
plea for simple assault/domestic where the sen-
tence falls outside the purview of a definition 
of an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(F) and even some that do; 2) how
Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) may
consider such a conviction or plea to be a crime
of domestic violence (CDV) and/or a crime
involving moral turpitude (CIMT); and 3) sug-
gestions as to how a client may fall outside the
aggravated felony category even if the client
must accept a one-year suspended sentence.
Crime of Domestic Violence pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) or Aggravated Felony
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)
Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Code renders
any alien (documented or undocumented) re -
movable if the alien at any time after admission
(or entry) was convicted of a CDV, stalking,
child abuse, child neglect or child abandonment.
The term “domestic violence” means crime of
violence as defined pursuant to section 16, Title
18 of the United States Code.3
Section 16, title 18 of the U.S.C. defines a
crime of violence as: “(a) an offense that has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person 
or property of another or (b) any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.” (empha-
sis added). Here, we will review only title 18
U.S.C. § 16(a), as it focuses on the misdemeanor
offense of simple assault or battery/domestic in
Rhode Island.4
RI Gen. Laws § 11-5-3 states as follows: (a)
Except as otherwise provided in § 11-5-2, every
person who shall make an assault or battery 
or both shall be imprisoned not exceeding one
year or fined not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars ($1,000), or both; (b) Where the provisions
of "The Domestic Violence Prevention Act,”
chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penal-
ties for violation of this section shall also
include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5.”
(emphasis added)
Notably, this section does not charge a defen-
 dant with one crime, but with two distinct
crimes: assault or battery or both. Although 
not defined by the statute, the terms assault and
battery have different and distinct definitions
and elements according to Rhode Island case law.
Assault is defined it as “an unlawful attempt 
or offer, with force or violence, to do corporal
hurt to another, whether with malice or wan-
tonness.” See State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d
170, 177 (R.I.1993).5
“[B]attery refers to an act that was intended
to cause, and does cause, an offensive contact
with or unconsented touching of or trauma
upon the body of another.” See McLaughlin,
621 A.2d at 177, citing to State v. Messa, 594
A.2d 882, 884 (R.I.1991) (quoting Proffitt v.
Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I.1983)).
When an alien is convicted6 of, or has pled
to, a charge of simple assault pursuant to RI
Gen. Laws § 11-5-3 and placed in removal pro-
ceedings, the issue at the immigration court
level is whether the alien is removable or inad-
missible as a result of having been convicted of
a crime of violence and/or a crime of domestic
violence (depending on the charge) or a crime
involving moral turpitude.7
The issue of what acts constitute a crime of
violence (COV) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 was
brought to the United States Supreme Court 
in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377 (2004).
Josue Leocal, a lawful, permanent resident
(LPR), was convicted under the Florida statute
for driving under the influence in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2004). The statute
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required a showing of only negligence.
The issue in Leocal became whether an
offense that does not require a showing
of intent is a COV pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 16. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct.
377 (2004).
The Leocal Court noted that the lan-
guage “use of physical force against the
person or property of another,” found in
18 U.S.C. § 16(a), required a higher degree
of intent than merely negligent or acci-
dental. Leocal 125 S. Ct. at 382. The
Supreme Court, however, never defined
the term “physical force,” until 2010 in
Johnson v. US, 130 S.Ct. 1265 (2010).
In 2007, the First Circuit in Lopes v.
Keisler, 505 F.3d 58 (1st Cir 2007) was
asked to answer the question of whether
a conviction/plea pursuant to RI Gen.
Laws § 11-5-3-/12-29-5 is considered a
COV pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), there -
by possibly rendering a foreign national
removable as an aggravated felon, pur-
suant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Lopes, a lawful permanent resident,
was charged with violation of RI Gen.
Laws § 11-5-3. The criminal complaint
stated that Lopes “commit[ted] assault
and battery upon the body of [name
omitted].” Lopes, 505 F.3d at 62. The
Department of Homeland Security sub-
mitted as evidence the criminal complaint
and the criminal docket sheet. The crimi-
nal docket sheet listed the charge as
“simple assault-domestic,” along with 
the various docket entries and the final
disposition.8 The Court in Lopes relied 
on the criminal docket sheet, holding that
“[t]he criminal docket report states that a
plea of nolo contendere was entered on a
count of simple assault-domestic. On the
basis of these two documents, it is clear
that Lopes was convicted of assault.”
Lopes, 505 F.3d at 62
The Court in Lopes also found that
the physical force required to commit an
assault, which, as defined in Rhode Island,
does not require touching at all,9 is suffi-
cient to be considered a crime of violence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16(a); and there-
fore, an aggravated felony for immigra-
tion purposes, as an assault in Rhode
Island requires a higher degree of intent
than negligent or mere accidental con-
duct. See Lopes, 505 F.3d at 63; see also
Immigration Nationality Act (hereinafter
INA) § 101(a)(43)(F).
As a result of the Lopes decision, a
charge of removal pursuant to INA’s
crime of domestic violence statute (8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I); INA § 237(a)(2)
(E)(i)) likely will be sustained if the alien
has a conviction pursuant to RI Gen.
Laws § 11-5-3/12-29-3, even if the alien
received probation or a filing and no sus-
pended sentence.
In 2010, the US Supreme Court in
Johnson v. US, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010)
was tasked with deciding whether the
Florida misdemeanor offense of battery
of “actually and intentionally touching”
another person has as an element “the
use…of physical force against the person
of another” pursuant to the definition of
“physical force” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)
(B) (i), and whether the Florida convic-
tion constitutes a “violent felony” under
the Armed Career Criminal Act, §
924(e)(1).
Violent felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B):
1. Has an element of use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another;
(emphasis added) or
2. Is burglary, arson or extortion
involves use of explosives or other-
wise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
The elements of a “violent felony” pur-
suant to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) mirror the ele-
ments of a “crime of violence” pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which may or may
not necessarily refer to a felony.
The Johnson Court then defined the
term “physical force” as follows: “‘physi-
cal’…plainly refers to the force exerted
by and through concrete bodies,” id at
1270; and “force” as power, violence 
or pressure directed against a person or
thing.” Id. The Court ultimately held that
the force required to meet the definition
of “physical force” in the context of a
violent felony is force that would not 
be satisfied by a mere touching, which is
all that is required for a violation of the
Florida battery statute. See Fla. Stat. §
784.03(2), see also State v. Hearns, 961
So.2d 211(FL 2007); Johnson, 130 S.Ct.
1265 (2010). The Court reiterated that it
was interpreting “physical force” in the
context of a violent felony and not in the
context of a battery. Johnson, 130 S.Ct.
at 1270, citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 US
1, 11 (2004).
Unfortunately, the definition of “phys-
ical force” in Johnson does not resolve
the question of what “physical force”
means in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 16. In
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2011, the First Circuit in US v. Booker,
644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir 2011) refused to use
the definition laid out in Johnson. Booker
644 F.3d at 19.
Booker and a second defendant,
Wayman, had both been convicted pur-
suant to the Lautenberg Amendment to
the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9)), which makes “unlawful for
any person who has been convicted in
any court of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence to … possess… any
firearm or ammunition.” Both defendants
had been convicted of Maine’s misde-
meanor simple assault statute, which pro-
vides that a person “is guilty of an assault
if the person intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury or offen-
sive contact to another.” Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.
Tit 17-A § 207(1); US v. Booker, 644 F.3d
12, 16 (1st Cir 2011).
The Lautenberg Amendment defines
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
as: “(1)…;(2) has as an element, the use,
attempted use of physical force, or threat-
ened use of a deadly weapon; and (3)....”
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
The Booker court refused the defini-
tion of “physical force” set out in
Johnson because the Supreme Court in
Johnson had specifically stated that it was
only defining a violent felony, not defin-
ing the meaning of “physical force” with-
in the context of a misdemeanor. See
Johnson, 130 S.Ct. at 1270, citing Leocal
v. Ashcroft, 543 US 1, 11 (2004). The
Booker court also refused to use the 
definition of a crime of violence under 
18 U.S.C. § 16 or violent felony under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) of the ACCA, because
the Court found that § 922(g)(9) of the
Lautenberg Amendment has a distinct
focus and singular purpose not covered
in any other statute. See Booker, 655
F.3d at 19, citing to US v. Mead 175 F.3d
215 at 211, 221 (1st Cir 1999).
The Booker court noted that Congress
expressly rejected § 16’s definition of
COV, adopting a definition for misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence that
was “probably broader” than that of
COV under § 16. The Booker court fur-
ther held that it would not interchange
the use of the definition of COV and
physical force between two distinct
statutes. See Booker, 644 F.3d at 19 cit-
ing to 142 Cong.Rec. S11872-01, S11877
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996). As such, the
practitioner is again left with the rulings
in Leocal and Lopes, which only require
that the elements of the crime carry a
higher degree of intent than merely negli-
gent. Notably, the court in Lopes never
reached the question as to whether a 
battery in Rhode Island is a crime of 
violence (Lopes, 505 F.3d at 62).
As there is no element of physical
force in the definition of a battery in
Rhode Island, and seeing as the “offen-
sive contact” and/or the “unconsented
touching” could be of a negligent or 
accidental nature, an Immigration Court
charged with removing an alien on the
basis of a battery conviction in Rhode
Island could likely rule in favor of an
alien of not having been convicted of 
a COV or CDV.
Practice Tip: Based on the above, it
would behoove a criminal practitioner
who is going to have his client plea to 
a charge of simple assault and battery/
domestic to have the prosecution first
amend the charge specifically to simple
battery/domestic and request that the
judge amend the record of conviction 
to read the charge to be battery and not
assault if, of course, the facts support
such a finding.
Crime of Moral Turpitude
DHS will charge an individual with
removability pursuant to the CIMT
statute of INA if the individual has a con-
viction10 for simple assault/battery, even
where there is no domestic sentence
enhancement, especially if the individual
has more than one offense on his/her
record. DHS can impose several charges
of either inadmissibility or removability
against an alien on the basis of CIMTs,
such as:
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); INA §
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) – any alien convicted
of, or who admits having committed,
or who admits committing acts which
constitute the essential elements of a
crime of moral turpitude is inadmissi-
ble;
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) any alien who is 
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within 5 years
([…]) after the date of admission and
(II) is convicted for a crime for which
a sentence of one year or longer may
be imposed is deportable;
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii); INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(ii) any alien who at any
time after admission has been convicted
(941) 928-0310
mjs@fl-estateplanning.com
www.fl-estateplanning.com
Estate Planning
Probate Administration
Probate Litigation
Elder Law
Corporate Law
Real Estate Closings
FLORIDA LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Rhode Island Bar Journal  January/February 2013 23
of two (2) or more crimes involving
moral turpitude, not arising from a
single scheme of criminal misconduct
regardless of whether confined or
whether a single trial is deportable.
INA does not define the term “moral
turpitude.” Moral turpitude is a vague
concept referring to conduct which
shocks the conscience as being inherently
base, vile or deprived, contrary to rules
of morality. Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N
Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988).
Prior to 2008, no set methodology ex -
isted for determining whether a predicate
offense fell within the purview of a CIMT.
However, in 2008, the US Attorney set to
clarify for the Immigration Judges and
the BIA a methodology to be used when
determining whether a predicate offense
involves moral turpitude. See Matter of
Silva-Trevino, A13-014-303 (BIA Aug 8,
2006).
Mr. Silva-Trevino, a Mexican, was
admitted to the US in 1962. In 2004,
Silva-Trevino pled to the criminal offense
of “indecency with a child” pursuant to
the Texas Penal Code, title 5, Section
21.11(a)(1). This statute makes it illegal
for a person to engage in sexual conduct
with a child under 17 who is not the
spouse. The statute defines sexual conduct
as “any touching by a person, including
touching through clothing, of the anus,
breast, or any part of the genitals of a
child, or any touching of any part of 
the body of a child, including touching
through clothing, with the anus, breast,
or any part of the genitals of a person if
committed with the intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of a person.”
Section 21.11(a)-(c). Mr. Silva-Trevino
received five years probation plus fines
and counseling.
Mr. Silva-Trevino was placed in removal
proceedings and charged as removable
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii);
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien having
been convicted of an aggravated felony.
He sought to adjust his status to a lawful
permanent resident, but was found to be
inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(2)(A)(i); INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), as a per-
son who has been convicted of a CIMT.
Silva-Trevino appealed to the BIA. 
The BIA reversed, finding that the Texas
statute involved morally reprehensible
conduct, and also some conduct not
morally reprehensible. The BIA held that
Silva-Trevino had not been convicted of 
a CIMT. See Matter of Silva-Trevino,
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Warwick, Rhode Island 02886
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A13-014-303 (BIA Aug 8, 2006).
In his opinion, the US Attorney
General (AG) in Matter of Silva-Trevino,
24 I&N Dec. 687 (AG 2008) reversed the
BIA’s decision and set out a methodology
to analyze these offenses by using three
separate, but not distinct, methods. First,
the AG states that the court/adjudicator
needs to decide if, categorically, the predi-
cate offense is a CIMT11 using a “realistic
probability approach.”
The “realistic probability approach”
focuses on the actual scope of the crimi-
nal statute by asking whether, at the time
of removal proceedings, any cases existed
where the criminal statute was applied to
conduct that does not involve moral turpi-
 tude. If there has been a state case that
applied the criminal statute to conduct
that does not involve moral turpitude,
then the inquiry ends and the predicate
offense cannot be deemed a CIMT.
However, if no such case exists, the AG
instructs the adjudicator to use the modi-
fied approach. See also Shepard v. US,
544 US 13 (2005).12
The AG goes a step further than the
modified approach, holding that since
most criminal statutes do not have moral
turpitude as an element, and seeing as
though this classification of charge can
only be made with additional information,
it only makes sense to allow the adjudica-
tor to go beyond the record, transcript
and plea agreement, and the adjudicator
is allowed to review all other documents
necessary to determine if the crime is one
that involves moral turpitude. Silva-
Trevino, 24 I&N Dec at _.
The AG clarifies that, whatever the
definition of a CIMT, it must involve at
the very least both reprehensible conduct
and some form of scienter, such as willful
or reckless. Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec at
__ fnt5 (AG 2008).
In summary, the offense must involve
both reprehensible conduct and some
form of scienter. The methodology used
to determine if the offense qualifies as a
CIMT is to first use the categorical/realis-
tic probability approach. If that does not
answer the question, use the modified
categorical approach by reviewing all
documents that may help answer the
inquiry (such as the police report, witness
statements, etc).13
As of this writing, at least four circuits
have rejected Silva-Trevino: Prudencio v.
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Holder, __ F.3d__ (4th Cir. Jan 30, 2012);
Jean-Louis v. Holder, 582 F.3d 462 (3rd
Cir 2009); Guardado-Garcia v. Holder,
615 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010); and Fajardo
v. US Attorney General, 659 F.3d 1303
(11th Cir 2011). The 3rd, 4th and 11th
Circuits held that the statute (INA §
212(a)(2)(A)(i)) was not ambiguous. The
8th Circuit held that Attorney General’s
decision did not merit deference.
The 1st Circuit did not explicitly reject
Silva-Trevino, but it did so implicitly
when it defined whether a conviction of
reckless conduct in New Hampshire was
a CIMT in Idy v. Holder, 674 F.3d 111
(C.A.1 2012), and did not use the
methodology set out in Silva-Trevino.
Most recently, in Palmeira v. Holder, the
1st Circuit very specifically stated that
that it would not decide whether to fol-
low the third step of Silva-Trevino, as the
court considers this issue controversial.
See Palmeira v. Holder, 2012 WL
1648909, fn 6, 7 (C.A.1).
So what does this all mean in the con-
text of a client charged with committing
a simple assault/battery pursuant to RI
Gen. Laws § 11-5-3? The answer is… 
we will have to wait and see!
As noted, the IJ will now be able to
look at all the documents, although maybe
not in this Circuit, to determine if the
predicate offense is a CIMT, keeping in
mind, all the while, that the offense must
possess reprehensible conduct and scienter.
In conclusion, if a defendant is facing
the charge of simple assault, and what
really occurred, based on the facts was a
battery, and your client decides to plead
to the offense, it behooves the client to
plea to the correct offense of battery and
to have the record of conviction/criminal
complaint amended to read that the
defendant is being charged with a battery
under the statute and not an assault, and
that the defendant is pleading to the bat-
tery portion of the statute.
ENDNOTES
1 The term “alien” in this article does not refer to
extra terrestrial beings. It is a term of art used by
the Department of Homeland Security to refer to
persons who are not citizens of the United States.
2 Although the resolution to a criminal charge of
a filing and/or probation with no fines is not con-
sidered to be conviction in Rhode Island, see RI
Gen. Laws §§ 12-10-12, 12-18-3, 12-19-36, these
types of dispositions would most definitely be con-
sidered “convictions” for immigration purposes. See
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), definition of conviction.
3 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
4 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-3
5 See also, TOUCH THIS! OVER-CRIMINALIZATION
OF OFFENSIVE CONDUCT, infra ftnt 8
6 Conviction as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
7 Inadmissibility refers to an alien’s undesirability
to be granted lawful permanent residence or a non-
immigrant visa as a result of some defect as enu-
merated in the Code § 1182. This is not the same
as an alien’s entry. Removability refers to Immigra -
tion’s ability to remove (deport) an alien who has
been admitted as a lawful permanent resident or
nonimmigrant or an undocumented alien on the
basis of a defect as enumerated in the Code § 1227.
Again this does not refer to an alien’s entry into
the United States.
8 The criminal docket sheet is not an official doc-
ument in RI and there is no legal rule as to how a
clerk at the District Court inputs the information
from a criminal complaint which is an official doc-
ument. Information obtained by the District Court
Clerk’s Office on July 30, 2012
9 See State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170,177 (RI
1993), citing to State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781 (RI
2980); see also TOUCH THIS! OVER-CRIMINALIZATION
OF OFFENSIVE CONDUCT, Jan/Feb. 02:5(50) by
David M. Zlonick and Carly Beauvais Iafrate.
10 Conviction is defined pursuant to the Code §
1101(a)(48)(A) as a formal judgment of guilt of the
alien entered by a court or if adjudication of guilty
has been withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has
found the alien guilty or the alien entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or as admitted sufficient
facts to warrant a finding of guilt and (ii) the judge
has ordered some form of punishment, penalty or
restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.
11 This categorical methodology is set out in
Taylor v. US, 495 US 575 (1990), which allows the
sentencing court under the federal statute to look
at the statutory elements, charging document, and
jury instructions to determine whether the predi-
cate offense qualifies as a violent felony.
12 The modified categorical approach allows the
sentencing court to determine if a predicate offense
is a violent crime/felony by looking not only at 
the record of conviction, but also transcript of the
colloquy, and the terms of the plea agreement, or
some other comparable judicial record. Shepard v.
US, 544 US 13 (2005); Taylor v. US, 495 US 575
(1990).
13 Keep in mind that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are VERY relaxed in Immigration
Proceedings. See 8 CFR § 1 240.7(a). v
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